

A
POLITICAL DISCOURSE
UPON THE
Different Kinds of MILITIA,
WHETHER

NATIONAL, MERCENARY, OR AUXILIARY.

By JOACHIM CHRISTIAN,
OF STRAELSUND in POMERANIA,
Pupil to the celebrated CONRINGIUS.

Translated into ENGLISH,


With a PREFACE suited to the present
IMPORTANT CRISIS.

By THOMAS WHISTON, M. A.

To these of wealth and all possessions void,
The name of country, as an empty sound,
Flies o'er the ear, nor warms their joyless hearts,
Who share no country.

GLOVER'S LEONIDAS.

L O N D O N:
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TO THE
HONOURABLE
George Townshend, Esq;
ELDEST SON
OF THE
RIGHT HONOURABLE
Lord Viscount TOWNSHEND,

A N D

One of the Knights of the Shire for
the County of *Norfolk*.

S I R,

AS soon as I had translated
this accurate treatise
upon the different kinds
of *Militia*, I could not hesitate

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a moment in the choice of a Patron. However, whilst I humbly offer it to your Patronage and Protection, I shall not launch out into the panegyric, usual upon these occasions, but shall give you nothing but plain truth and *English* sincerity. As I have the true interest of my country really at heart, so I have no other motive, Sir, in dedicating this treatise to you, but because you seem to me to promote that interest *most*.

Your firm and steady conduct in the last sessions of parliament, and the extraordinary pains you took in promoting a *National Militia*, will be remembered

membered to your Honour in
 the future and impartial annals
 of the *British* history. It too
 often happens, indeed, that the
 passions and prejudices of man-
 kind draw a veil over their un-
 derstandings; that they are not
 only blind to their own good,
 but even hate the man that la-
 bours to bring about and effect
 it. In such a case, the merit of
 virtue, and the consciousness of
 having acted well, are our only
 reward and support. This, Sir,
 may possibly prove your own
 case, whilst you so steadily pur-
 sue those salutary *measures*,
 which can alone revive and esta-
 blish the present dying honour
 of

of your country. And give me leave to say, that you will always find the benefit in every stage of life, in following a set of honest *principles*, not a *party* of men, who are continually changing to every quarter of their own variable compass.

If the bill passes this ensuing session, your country will repeat your name with *joy*; if not, your very opposers, blind and infatuated as they are at present, will reflect upon it with *Honour*, when *Necessity* has taught them what neither history or the experience of past or present ages can inculcate. Your attempt, Sir, is just and noble, whatever
may

may be the success of it; and the name of MILITIA TOWNSEND will certainly throw an additional lustre upon any other titles you may hereafter be possessed of.

I shall not offend your delicacy, by saying what may be charged with adulation, and unfit for a Gentleman of your known good sense to hear. I have said nothing but the truth, and here I am sure to stand upon a solid foundation. That you may live long and happily; that you may live to see your dear country *armed* in its own defence, and not *trust to the uncertain fidelity of foreign mercenaries,*

(viii)

naries, is the hearty wish of,
Honourable Sir,

Your most devoted,

and most obedient Servant,



THO. WHISTON.

*Ramsay, in Hunt-
ingdonshire, Nov. 18,
1756.*

Just published,
Price One Shilling,

(Proper to be read at this Juncture)

AN EARNEST ADDRESS to both HOUSES of PAR-
LIAMENT, upon the present Posture of Affairs.

By a GENTLEMAN.

A

T H E
P R E F A C E.

THERE is no observation more just, than that the Glory and Strength of a kingdom do not so much depend upon its own *absolute force*, as upon the skill and *prudence* of those that manage and direct that *force*. The histories of all ages and nations afford us the most convincing evidence of this remark, that the superior abilities of a *Sovereign*, a *first Minister*, or a *great Commander*, have raised a nation to the most envied heights of *Power*; and *vice versa*, that the want of these, the unskilfulness and *imprudence* of those that preside, have as often reduced it to as low an *ebb* in as short a space.

I speak it with the utmost grief, that from the management and transactions of our present war with *France*, which we have *already* seen, we have more reason to *dread* that the *latter* will be our *misfortune*, than to *hope* it will be crowned with that Glory and Success which once adorned and distinguished this nation. If we succeed, our *pilots* at the Helm must improve greatly in the *art* of *political* management.

And as these are the sentiments of many able men *at home*, so I shall prove it in some measure to be the opinion of *Foreigners* from the following story, which was told me by a gentleman, who had occasion this summer to visit *Yarmouth*. He happened accidentally to fall in company with a *Dutch merchant*. During the conversation, he had the curiosity to ask the *Dutchman* what the sensible part of the people in *Holland* thought of our present disputes with *France*.

France. He gravely answered, that they thought we had as *wise* and as *good* a *King* as *England* had been blessed with for a long time, and as *weak* a M——y; and that the *French* had as *wise* and *able* a M——y and as *weak* a *Prince*. I shall make no remarks upon *Mynbeer's* observation; but it occasioned me immediately to recollect a *political aphorism* of another of *Conringius's* pupils, *Principem malum esse, habere autem bonos consiliarios minus nocet, quam si princeps quidem bonus sit, sed imprudentes circum se habeat consiliarios.* In the original it is *improbos*, but it seemed too coarse, and *perhaps* an undeserved appellation upon the present occasion. Every man must know and be conscious of his own *Wickedness*, but *few* can discern their own *Weakness*. As it is a more obstinate distemper, so it is more hard to know, and more difficult to cure.

I admire therefore the prudence of *Marshal Villeroy*, the great Favourite of *Lewis* the XIVth. After the battle of *Ramillies*, he desired to be dismissed from the command, though his fond Master would have continued him in it. The *Marshal* had exerted his utmost skill, as he supposed, to defeat *Marlborough* at that Battle, by his *Method* of drawing up the army; and yet the *very method* he chose was the grand occasion of his defeat. He was *wise* enough to know his own *Weakness*, which is a piece of wisdom *few men* are acquainted with. Most men are *vain* enough to think of retrieving *one* error by committing *another*. It were sincerely to be wished that *many others* would follow his Example; would be so ingenuous as to confess their *want of Skill*,

* Memoirs of the *Marquiss de Fequieres*.
Voltaire's age of *Lewis* the XIVth.

and resign those *Posts* and *Employments* they are by no means qualified to fill.

But though appearances are unpromising, and we have as yet seen no *good plan* of operation attempted to be formed, yet I utterly detest all violent *Means* and *Measures*. They wear the unnatural Aspect of *party*, not *principle*; of private resentment or *something worse*, rather than of *public spirit* and love for our *country*. Hence I am led not only to approve but *applaud* the spirited but dutiful *Addresses* that have been offered either directly to the *Throne*, or their *own Members*, upon this occasion. They breathe the *true spirit* of *English Liberty*, and yet *affection* to the *Sovereign*, and I doubt not will produce a salutary effect in the course of the *War*. These will augment the care and vigilance of the A——n, when they find their Conduct thus *modestly* arraigned

arraigned by the nation in general. *
 Some of them are particularly agreeable to me, which express that the loss of *Minorca* was a high reflection upon our *political* as well as *martial* Glory. These speak the whole truth at once, for certainly it was attended with the most *disgraceful circumstances* to both.

The ignominious loss of that island is a subject worn almost threadbare, and therefore I shall touch but lightly upon it. It is better to endeavour to redress *past* misfortunes by a more prudent conduct for the future, than run into an excess of violence for what is now *too late* to recall. However, I shall support the *noble Sentiments* contained in the forementioned Addresses, and shew there was a want of *Policy* somewhere else, as well as *Cowardice* or *Treachery* in the *Commander*.

* *Vide* the Addresses from *Somersetshire*, *Norfolk*, and *Chester*.

First, *Byng* was sent out *originally* with an insufficient force.

Secondly, He was absolutely an improper man to send out.

I do not assert these positions at random, or depend upon vague and uncertain evidence, but will undertake to prove it to the conviction of every impartial man, and from the *very account* which the A——n itself has thought proper to give us of the matter.

Byng was sent out *originally* with a force absolutely insufficient, because it was impossible to know whether *Commodore Edgcumbe* could join him or not. The account I mean is that of *Lord Augustus Harvey*, dated at *Villafranca*, and published in the *Gazette*. We received the first *certain* intelligence from that *Gentleman* of the sailing of the *French fleet*, the number and strength of their *squadron*. He acquaints the *Lords of the Admiralty*,
 3 that

that he would sail that *very evening*, and give advice to *Commodore Edgcumbe* if possible. The *chance* was *against him*, because the *French* fleet was actually *sailed*. He therefore ran the greatest hazard of being taken by the enemy. How then was he extricated from so great a dilemma? By the *French* sailing with their *whole force* to the opposite side of the island, and at the greatest distance from the harbour of *Portmabon*. This error of the *French*, if I may so term it, gave *Lord Augustus* an opportunity to apprize Mr. *Edgcumbe* of the orders he had received from *England*. So that Mr. *Edgcumbe's* junction with the *Admiral's Squadron* was entirely owing to *accident*, and not to any *timely order* or *previous plan* of operation, in case the event happened. Supposing then Mr. *Edgcumbe* had been confined in the harbour, what must have been the consequence? If his *ships* could

could have been placed in such a manner, as not to be destroyed by the *French batteries*, yet he could have received no intelligence of the arrival of *Byng*. In such a case therefore, *Byng* with his *ten ships* of the line only, must have fought *twelve French ships* of the line and *five large frigates*. It was not owing to the foresight of the A——n that *this event* did not happen, and therefore *Byng* was sent out originally with an insufficient force. Supposing it had been possible for him to have defeated them, yet where was the *Prudence* of such a conduct, in a case of such vast Importance?

Secondly, *Byng* was absolutely an improper man to send out. I have heard *such excuses* from a set of men, who would continue to excuse the M——y, were we reduced to ten times a lower ebb than we are at present ; “That *Byng* never lay under the imputation of *Cow-*

C

ardice

ardice before, and therefore there could be no objection against his being sent." I heard this asserted by a *noble Lord* at the head of his admiring Aldermen, who understood good cheer better than *Politicks*. A way of reasoning the most strangely inconclusive, that a man ought to be sent out upon an expedition, when, by their own account, he was not so much as *known* to be *equal* to the command. It was not sufficient to know barely that he was not a *Coward*, and only *negatively good*; for that was in fact to know *nothing*. The bravest and *most experienced* Admiral in the navy *ought* to have been sent; but *Byng* was an *untry'd* and *inexperienced Commander*, and therefore *ought not* to have been sent. Let us only shift the scene, and ask whether *that people* could be deemed at all *prudent*, who trusted the Fate and Glory of their country to a *General* who never saw an engagment?

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We must think them extremely *weak* and *unwise* if they did.

I forbear to urge any thing farther upon so disagreeable a subject. It seems only necessary to add, that when *Byng* came up with the *French Fleet* he was strong enough, and therefore all the other fatal consequences of that affair seem to be justly chargeable upon himself. I am fully convinced that the *French Fleet* would never have failed, nor the expedition been undertaken, unless they they had been previously apprized of the disability, or *something worse* of the *Commander*.

It is impossible to avoid making this observation, that we seem to have changed hands with the enemy, and substituted *French Gasconade* in the room of *English Valour*. What mighty things were promised from the then *secrecy* of our counsels, the *great experience* of our naval directors, and the *strength* of

our *fleets*? We seemed to have got possession of *Van Trump's Broom* to sweep the ocean clear of all *French* ships. But, alas, we soon saw the disgraceful end of all such empty Bravados.

Quid dignum tanto feret hic promissor hiatu?

Parturient montes, nascetur ridiculus mus.

We are exactly in the same situation as if a great, strong, awkward country fellow should mount the stage to combat with a skillful and active *Boxer*. The countryman lays furiously about him, but, *unskilled* as he is, only *beats the air*, and *spends his strength for nought*; till at last, having exhausted that strength he so vainly boasted of, the *little champion* tumbles him headlong to the ground, and laughs at him. This is our own case at present; we have

great

great strength at *sea*, but seem not to know how to manage or exert it.

But *at land* our power is really contemptible, when compared with that of *France*, and *must* be so, till we have a *National* and well-disciplined *Militia*, or keep a much more numerous *standing Army*. The *latter* cannot be attempted in a *free country*, and therefore *the other* must be established, or the *French* will always play the same game upon us, and, whenever we are at war with them, threaten us with an *Invasion*. It is a terrible circumstance for any country to be *disarmed* and *defenceless*. It is the most *alarming* circumstance, and yet our rulers at present seem resolved neither to remedy or be alarmed at it. Their apprehensions are strangely misplaced; for they seem rather to be *alarmed* at the *danger* of *having*, than *not having* a *Militia*. I shall barely ask a single question,

stion, and leave it for these gentlemen to answer. Can any *honest man* oppose this motion, that his country may be put into a defensible posture? The strong disinclination therefore of our *political* managers to set a *Militia* on foot in this kingdom, which is but too apparent, is really astonishing. A *Militia* must be productive of the happiest consequences, but cannot possibly prove prejudicial either to the *Sovereign* or the *Subject*.

But since it is the peculiar *misfortune* of this nation to be always *divided* into *parties*, hence I was induced to republish the following learned treatise, upon the different kinds of *Militia*. It is a very scarce and valuable piece, and the reader is sure to be entertained and instructed with sentiments, which favour neither of *prejudice* or party. The present debate as to a *Militia* is here largely discussed, and *our own* situation exactly

exactly described, yet *the author* must be considered as a fair and impartial writer. The sentiments that flow from such a writer, absolutely unconcerned in the present dispute, and where the subject is treated of abstractedly as a *thesis*, must be worth *whole volumes* of political tracts, full of party-rage and dictated by the spirit of opposition.

I think it an honour to declare, that the *translation* of this treatise into *English* was undertaken at the desire of as honest and learned a member of the *House of Commons* as any that honourable house affords. And it is with the highest satisfaction I mention it, that I have leave given me to publish the following letter from the same *worthy gentleman* upon the subject of a *Militia*.

SIR,

“ Though I have often heard *Mi-*
 “ *litias* ridiculed, as I have every thing
 “ that

“ that is *good* and *great*, yet I have
 “ always thought that they who do so,
 “ either never read History, had forgot
 “ what they had read, or considered it
 “ no more than they did the history of
 “ *Tom Thumb*. And I am convinced
 “ that a *Militia* must be established in
 “ this country, or we must be slaves
 “ to *France*, or to some of our own
 “ Princes, should they be so unadvised
 “ as to seize upon our liberties. No
 “ attempts of that nature have been
 “ made since the *revolution*: but may
 “ they not? and could *any resistance* be
 “ offered if there should? And is it not
 “ true, that *et si non molestus sit domi-*
 “ *nus, miserimum tamen est, posse si*
 “ *velit?*

“ I have heard and read, that it was
 “ impossible to establish a *Militia* that
 “ could be useful in this country, or
 “ which would not encrease the power
 “ of the officers of the crown. I own

“ it is very difficult, but I do not think
 “ it impossible; and that difficulty
 “ arises rather from *those* who have al-
 “ ways opposed *Militia Bills*, than
 “ from the thing itself.

“ I was this day asked, if I ever
 “ knew a *free country* that had a *Mi-*
 “ *litia*? My answer was, that there
 “ never *was*, *is not*, or ever *will be* a
 “ free country *without one*. The *Swiss*
 “ Cantons and *Geneva*, I can testify,
 “ have excellent *Militias*. The great
 “ and *free* towns in *Germany* are said
 “ to have them. *Sweden*, which is free,
 “ has a *Militia sui generis*. *Ireland*
 “ is said to have a good *Militia* of
 “ 40,000 to 60,000 men, all Pro-
 “ testants. The *Dutch* had an excel-
 “ lent *Militia* in their great towns.
 “ Our own plantations *have* excellent
 “ *Militias*, or *Cape Breton* had never
 “ been taken. The *Irish* Protestants
 “ in 1688, 89 and 90 performed things
 D “ almost

“ almost incredible. Every page of the
 “ *Grecian* and *Roman* story gives the
 “ lye to these gentlemen. I call to
 “ witness *Marathon* and *Plataea*, and
 “ they who never asked *how many* the
 “ enemy were, but *where* they were,
 “ were nothing but *Militias*. The *dicta-*
 “ *tor* who was elected in the morning,
 “ enrolled an army that afternoon,
 “ marched to a victorious enemy the
 “ next day, and defeated them the
 “ third, commanded only a *Militia*.
 “ And these same people having laid
 “ aside *Militias*, and keeping standing
 “ forces, were beat by all their neigh-
 “ bours with *Militias* only.

“ *Machiavell* justly says, that though
 “ *France* is much more powerful than
 “ *England*, yet that when *Edward*
 “ the IVth attacked *Lewis* the XIth
 “ with only 18 or 20,000 men, he
 “ made the whole kingdom shake;
 “ and gives this reason, that *England*
 “ was

“ was then kept *armed*, but that *Lewis*
 “ being desirous to play the tyrant,
 “ kept *France unarmed*. Let me con-
 “ clude with *Xenophon* to the *Persian*
 “ monarch, for I am quite tired: “ If
 “ he desires our arms, as a *friend*, it
 “ will be best for *him*, that we keep
 “ them; if as an *enemy*, best for *our-*
 “ *selves*.” I wish much health to you
 “ and yours, and am, &c. &c.”

Such a *Member* is a real honour to
 the county he represents; and there-
 fore, it is presumed, *his Constituents*
 will be unanimous in their suffrages at
 the next election for a *Gentleman*, who
 is upon all accounts so true a patriot
 and so worthy a representative.

I shall make but one observation
 upon this admirable letter, which is,
 that if the *Duke of Burgundy* had not
 trifled away his time at the siege of
Nuz, but had joined *Edward* the IVth,
 according to his promise, with all his

forces in *Picardy*, the *latter* would have found *France* a much easier conquest than either of his predecessors, *Edward* the III^d. or *Henry* the Vth had done before him. He *must* have found it so from *this very* circumstance which *Machiavell* mentions, that *France* was kept *unarmed*.

As there seems to be so strong an aversion in a *particular body* of men to establish a *Militia* in this kingdom, it is natural to suppose they would produce some *weighty reasons* to justify their opposition, and to take off the odium of so unpopular a conduct. I have been therefore peculiarly attentive to the several objections that have been urged against it, but have not so much as heard a *single one* that deserves the *name* of an objection. Men may *cavil* for ever, but when they pretend to *object*, they ought to have at least the appearance of reason and argument on their side.

sider. However, I will venture to affirm there *can* be *none*, but what are more than sufficiently answered in the following translation. Our *Anti-militia* gentlemen always put me in mind of Mr. *Dryden's* answer to the young fellow who found fault with the continency of his principal character in the play of *Cleomenes*. If I had been alone with *the lady*, I should not have passed my time like your *Spartan*, says the pert modern. The poet gravely reply'd,
 “ *That may be, but give me leave to*
 “ *tell you, Sir, you are no hero.*” The same universal answer may be given to our present cavillers against a *Militia*.
 “ *That may be, but give me leave to*
 “ *tell you, Sir, you are no politician.*”

As to the fact itself, that the establishment of a *Militia* will be extremely beneficial to the nation, I shall prove it so plain, and by *two* circumstances so notorious that I defy the most time-serving

serving person either to evade or contradict them. I shall undertake to shew the vast disproportion of our *internal* strength, when we *had*, and when we *had* not a *Militia*, from *two* incidents in the *English* history, which are exactly parallel to each other. The *two* years I mean are 1513 and 1745.

In the former year, when *Henry* the VIIIth determined to pass over into *France* with a gallant army and attack *Lewis* the XIIth, he was justly suspicious that *James* the IVth of *Scotland* would seize that opportunity to invade the northern part of *England*. In consequence of this, he left the Earl of *Surrey* behind him, with orders to array the *Militia* of the *northern counties*. The affair happened just as *Henry* expected. *James* prepared to invade *England*, and sent his declaration of war to *Henry*, while he was employed at the siege of *Terouenne*. The *English* historians

historians universally agree, that the *Scotch* army was sixty thousand strong, with the *King himself* at their head, and all the flower of their nobility. It was certainly very numerous, because *Buchanan* takes pains to prove it was much lessened by desertion and other causes. The *English Militia* under my Lord *Surrey*, amounted to *twenty-six thousand*. The two armies engaged at *Floddon-field*, where, to the eternal honour of our *English Militia*, and the eternal reproach of our *Anti-militia* men, the *Scots* were entirely routed, their *King* slain, and most of the principal nobility of *Scotland*.

This incident of the *English* history is exactly parallel to the year 1745, when the rebels invaded *England*. As our *regular troops* were then employed in *Flanders*, so were all our best troops in the time of *Henry*. Please only to observe the superiority of our strength
when

when we had a *Militia*. The *English Militia only* defeats one of the finest armies that ever entered *England* in a hostile manner. In the latter case in 1745, when we had *no Militia*, we saw six or seven thousand ragged rebels penetrate almost to the centre of the kingdom, while the poor *unarmed* inhabitants fled before them, like so many sheep. I here call upon the opposers of the *Bill* to justify themselves, and beg to know how they can answer it either to their conscience or their country. What a wilful and obstinate opposition is here made to a *Bill*, that can *alone* render us a *respectable people* again? It is impossible, but we must always be subject to the same inconveniencies *without it*.

There is no alternative; if we are at war with *France*, we must either have a well disciplined *Militia*, introduce *foreign mercenaries* to defend us, or labour
under

under the constant *alarm*, if not the *execution* of a *French invasion*. Can any *Englishman*, any man that was born in this land of ancient bravery and liberty, hesitate for a moment, which he would chuse? I shall just ask another question, which I shall be obliged to these gentlemen to resolve.—Why are the *native English* to be denied the use of *arms*, and rendered unwarlike, in order to bring over *foreign mercenaries*? Is not *England* able to defend herself? If she is not, I know what must soon be the consequence. God forbid! that I should attempt to exasperate the nation against the *foreign mercenaries* now in this kingdom. It was a *temporary expedient* to secure a *disarmed* and unprepared people, but a *wretched one* indeed, if ever repeated again. 'The histories of our own and other nations contain the most glaring evidence, what a prodigious hazard that people must

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run,

run, who are obliged to have a constant recourse to *foreign mercenaries* for support.

Whatever puff and parade the *Saxon* historians may make, that they were invited over here to assist a defenceless and distressed people, yet, if we may credit *Gildas* of *Bath*, no contemptible writer, and who lived in the very age when the *event* happened, they were only *hired* and brought over as *mercenaries*. When they were once over, and found themselves superior to the *Natives*, who were at discord among themselves, it was no hard matter to find pretences to quarrel. I forbear to quote the words of *Gildas* and venerable *Bede*, where they describe the horrid cruelties exercised upon the *poor Natives*, lest I should seem to design to aggravate matters too far.

Carthage, a very powerful and trading state, is said to have greatly profited

fited by *mercenaries*. It is true, indeed, that she reaped a considerable benefit from *these troops* in her long conflicts with the *Romans*. But the fact was plainly this, that *Carthage*, with all *her own* and her *mercenary* forces, was at last conquered by a *Roman Militia*. Besides, what is yet more home to the point, is, that immediately after their first war with the *Romans*, *Carthage* itself was brought to the brink of destruction by her own *mercenaries*. They *mutinied for pay*, which is no uncommon case; and, if things remain in the same situation, *may* be heard of in other places besides *Carthage*. This mighty state must have fallen a prey to its *own mercenaries*, nor would *Rome* have enjoyed the ignominious glory of destroying it, had not *Hamilcar*, who was the greatest Captain of the age, been recalled home to defend his country. With *ten thousand* of their *own*

troops he defeated the much more numerous bodies of *mercenaries*. So great an influence in the management of an army has the superior abilities of *one man*. *Hamilcar* was the greatest commander that *Carthage* ever produced, except his own son *Hannibal*. And he had the advantage of improving himself in the art of war under so great a father.

We find then that experience and the safety of our country loudly call upon us to put an effectual stop to such dangerous proceedings, as the repeated employment of *foreign mercenaries*. If there is no danger *at present*, there *must* be *hereafter*. It is best to nip the evil in the bud, and to practice the physical maxim, *venienti occurrere morbo*. If the bill does not unanimously pass this ensuing session, I cannot avoid saying, that we are envelop'd in a cloud of *Egyptian* darkness, that every body
can

can *feel* but *ourselves*; that a spirit of slumber and infatuation has seized the nation, and that *quos Deus vult perdi, prius dementat*.

As to the present bill, as it now stands, it seems calculated to serve the purpose as well as any other that can *at first* be resolved upon. It is impossible for the wit of man to fix upon *any scheme*, that will at once answer every purpose and be absolutely perfect. It ought to be the business of *future* parliaments to supply what is wanting, and remedy any defects *pro re nata*. Time and experience will soon bring it to the greatest possible perfection, and the wisdom of parliament will be nobly employed in so salutary a work. The only defect that I can at present discover in the bill is, that the number proposed is *too small*. It is indispensibly necessary that we should always have *one* hundred thousand men, expert and exercised

exercised in arms, ready to repel any attempts of our enemies either *at home* or *abroad*.

I have but one thing more to add in the preface, which is of the utmost importance to the nation, and will prove even to demonstration, that nothing herein contained is dictated by the *spirit* of *party*, but proceeds from a real concern for the honour of my King and Country. A war with *France* will naturally occasion a vast expence, and therefore, in order to bring it to a speedy and happy conclusion, money must not be wanting. But the question is, how must effectual supplies be raised by a nation already overloaded with *debts* and *taxes*? The *Ways-and-Means* gentlemen seem to be at the *end* of all their *expedients*. They have run their race and fairly got to the end of it. As for *new taxes*, it seems impracticable to lay any, but what must prove too prejudicial

cial and oppressive to *trade* or to the *subject*. I shall therefore propose to the serious consideration of parliament the following method. Such is the love for his Majesty and our country, and so great the detestation of *French* tyranny, that it will *annually* produce more than any *four new taxes*, were it possible to impose *so many*. The *Crown* of *England* has been twice pawned, by *two* of the most illustrious Princes that ever wore it, to carry on their wars against *France*. I mean *Edward* the III^d and *Henry* the Vth. The case, indeed, was different then, because *the King* was possessed of large demesnes of his *own*, and consequently was able to *redeem* it afterward. But the demesnelands of the *Crown* are long since alienated, and his Majesty can have *no supplies*, but what have the sanction and authority of parliament. The method I am going to propose should never be
used

used but *in cases* of the utmost importance and emergency; such as, I presume, few men will deny the present to be. It has been before used by *two* of our Princes, in their wars with *France*. I mean *Edward* the IVth and *Henry* the VIIth; by the first *without*, and by the latter *with* the consent and authority of parliament. Though *Edward's* method was more *unjustifiable*, it was really less *iniquitous*. For the parliament in that case were the *dupes* of *Henry*, whose principal policy consisted in the art of squeezing money out of his subjects. The reader must understand by this time, that I mean a VOLUNTARY BENEVOLENCE. There is not the same objections to such a *Benevolence* now, as might have been made to *Henry*; for his design was more to fill his own coffers, than to carry on a war against *France*.

The

The *House of Commons* has the sole undoubted right to raise money upon the subject, and to enquire into the application of it: and therefore I would advise that it might be done by a *parliamentary* authority. Leave may be given by his Majesty and both Houses of Parliament for the subject to advance what sum of money he pleases, to be at the disposal of the House of Commons for the service of his Majesty, but neither *principal* or *interest* to be returnable. Whatever is given this way, I would have absolutely, and in every sense *voluntary*. It seems requisite that a *select committee* of that Honourable House should be appointed, to attend upon this business, and give *receipts* to the several corporations, colleges, noblemen, &c. &c. who are willing to afford assistance upon so pressing an occasion. No less than *three* of the

committee ought to sign every *receipt* with their *own band*, in order to prevent any fraud, and the *receipts* to be immediately transmitted to the several contributors, nearly in the following form :

Received of T. C. &c. the sum of * * * *, being his *voluntary Benevolence* for the service of his Majesty and his Country for the year 1757.

That Honourable House may depute and appoint the *General-receivers* for the several counties, any eminent bankers in *London*, *merchants* or *gentlemen* in the country, or their own *select committee*, to receive what is thus *voluntarily* advanced. I shall trace it no farther at present, but shall leave the proper management of this *great transaction* to the prudence of parliament. It
will

will be found a *safe*, easy and expeditious way of raising money, ready to be employed upon some important expedition, to distress our perfidious enemies, and bring them to reason. It will produce a much *more considerable* sum than may at first be imagined, and the *application* of the money ought to be left solely to the discretion of the House of Commons, who will take care to concert proper measures with his Majesty, and a committee of the *upper house* upon this occasion.

There are a vast number of opulent *merchants* and traders, who pay little to the *land-tax*, and whose *stock* is valued at a trifle. There are rich corporations, colleges, parishes, besides particular persons, which will generously contribute to maintain the honour and independency of their country. But above all, the great number of *Nobility*

and *Gentlemen*, who in the several departments enjoy lucrative posts and offices under the government, will surely contribute a *small part* of their *salaries*. When I mentioned *this scheme* to a very worthy member of the *lower house*, he shook his head and said, he was afraid the least would come from this quarter. If it should be carried into execution, and this gentleman's suspicion prove true, they deserve much more *opprobrious names* than I shall think *decent* at present to give them.

I believe it might be demonstrated, that the execution of this plan would be the *only means* to bring the present war with *France* to a speedy and honourable *end*. Every other scheme will be found upon trial insufficient, where the *principal* or *interest* is to be *repaid*. This must increase the *national debt*,
and

and consequently the *national distress*, which will some time or other prove *fatal* to this nation. The scheme I have proposed would in all probability be the means of a *vast saving* to this kingdom; for when once the *French* ministry found us resolutely determined to defend our King, our country and possessions, they would *sooner* hearken to reasonable terms. And the *sooner* the war is concluded, *the less* will be the *expence*. In the reign of *Richard* the 1st, when war was to be carried on against *France*, and the Duke of *Bretagne* to be vigorously supported, the supplies granted were found insufficient. The parliament upon that account ordered a *new subsidy* to be levied upon the *rich* only. The burthen was entirely born by the *nobility, clergy* and *gentry*. I sincerely wish that our *nobility* and *gentry*, instead of hunting after

after such foolish and expensive diversions, would contribute nobly for the support and welfare of their country.

The establishment of the *Marine Society* at present is a noble undertaking; but, as it is now circumstanced, from the very nature of it can only produce a confined and *partial* good. If they had recollected what had been done in former ages, when the pride and power of *France* was to be limited within due bounds, they would naturally have fallen and fixed upon *my plan*. As it is more extensive and *universal* than theirs, so it will produce a more extensive and *universal* good. Let us resolve to exert ourselves, nor ever suffer the misfortunes of the present war to *bring down the grey hairs* of our good old monarch, who has governed us so mildly and happily
for

for thirty years, *with sorrow to the grave.*

My design in proposing this scheme is at once to consult the honour of his Majesty, the interest of my country, and the authority of parliament. And these are all points which it behoves every *honest Englishman* strictly to regard and maintain.

What many other writers have said upon the subject I know not. I have read but *one*, and the * author's manner is highly *displeasing* to me. He writes in a passion, his sentiments glow with resentment, and he will never obtain the *end* he pretends to *mean*, the *interest* of his country.

I shall not detain the reader any longer from the following translation,

* First, second, &c. letters to the people of *England.*

of which I shall say nothing. Let it stand or fall by its own merit. I only hope that I have not mistaken the sense of the author in any material instance.

A
POLITICAL TREATISE
UPON THE
Different Kinds of MILITIA.

Printed at *Helmſtad* in *Germany*, in the Year 1663.

THAT celebrated philosopher *Aristotle*, makes a very accurate distinction, when he divides all human life into a mixture of business and leisure, WAR and PEACE. It is for the interest of most republics that *the latter* should prevail, as being most excellent in itself, and for the recovery of which, the very * efforts of

* Arist. Pol. lib. 7. c. 2. Cic. lib. 1. de Off.

war ought to have a direct and immediate tendency. But because that blessing cannot always be obtained with safety to the *constitution*, nor is the *end* and *aim* of every commonwealth the same, hence it arises that, unless they can find a resource from the arts of war, whenever that misfortune approaches, every such state must be in a *very desperate and deplorable situation*. The same * philosopher very properly observes, that in settling every commonwealth, and all the deliberations tending to that purpose, the strictest regard and attention ought to be paid to the times of *War* as well as *Peace*.

2d, That every state ought to be prepared for both these events is plainly evident from hence, that if they neglect the arts of War, even *Peace* itself will sometimes be converted to a misfortune. We may safely conclude that

* Arist. Rhet. lib. 1. cap. 4.

in such a case seditions will be frequent, and the commonwealth itself not far from destruction. It very often happens that several states are excellently adapted to the arts of *Peace*, but very ill provided, or in short not at all, in case of a *War*. * *Phaleas* very unhappily fell into this error, who accommodated his republic only to the times of *Peace*. *Aristotle* justly reprehends him for this fault, and says, † *it is absolutely necessary that every nation should be prepared for war.*

3d, On the other hand you may find several other states sufficiently provided against the times of *War*, and practiced in its arts, but not at all suited to the times of *Peace*, and even

* This is some obscure lawgiver, mentioned nowhere that I can find but in *Aristotle's* politics. By the very nature and constitution of his commonwealth it must soon come to nothing, but must fall the easy prey of the first invader.

† *Aristot. Pol. lib. 2. cap. 5.*

impatient under its continuance. The same *Aristotle* very justly blames the *Spartan* republic for this fault, condemning *Lycurgus* and the other founders of that commonwealth of a grievous blunder, because they accustomed the citizens to nothing but warlike actions. Any one that is at all versed in the history of ancient nations cannot avoid finding and censuring the same fault in the *Roman* republic, which was entirely occupied in the business of *War*, but almost wholly neglected the arts of *Peace*. They raised up one War from the ruins of another, but very rarely deliberated how they might improve the quiet and repose of the commonwealth. Hence *Tacitus* very truly remarks of this people, that the law of the twelve tables contained the whole substance of their jurisprudence, and that *the laws which were practiced at Rome, when men attempted*

*to obtain illegal honours, to expel any too powerful and popular citizens, and to prevent other enormities, were all made by force.** Hence we have no reason to be surprized that the *Roman* republic always languished in a state of inaction, and that when their eagerness and thirst of War was once over, the *Roman* valour gradually declined and came to nothing. I say we need not be surprized at this, because it is an event that *must* happen, and has already happened to all those warlike nations that are unskilled in the arts of Peace. The *Goths*, after a thousand years war, conquered almost the whole world, and brought it under their yoke, and yet, when they had conquered it, did not know how to keep it. This same observation will hold good of the affairs of *Persia*.

* Tac. Ann. lib. 3.

4th, The best remedy for both these inconveniences is the assistance of good laws, and the exercise of arms. *Aristotle* agrees to this opinion, when he tells us, that there is a * *necessity both for justice and valour*; nor can any state subsist for any considerable time without them. So likewise *Polybius*;† *There are two things, he says, to which every nation owes its preservation, namely, fortitude against their enemies abroad, and peace and unity at home.* But first of all good laws are necessary to the tranquillity of every state, and to direct the actions of every citizen to that excellent order and regularity, which constitutes their happiness. To attain this end it is necessary they should be used to an honest and virtuous industry, and have a sufficient competency as a reward for their virtue.

* Pol. lib. 3. c. 8.

† Lib. 6.

Upon this account it is that *justice* is extremely well adapted to every state, as the practice of *civil law* means no more than the * order and harmony of every society. But my business and design at present is not to enquire any farther into the institution and utility of laws.

5th, In the second place, *the citizens of every trade, even in time of peace, ought to strengthen their bodies and brace their nerves by warlike exercises, that they may know how to repell force by force in case of an attack. They ought to be highly careful in the performance of this article, lest their minds should be diverted from the constant pursuit of virtue, and they should be rendered effeminate by idleness and sloth. As iron, unless continually used, is eat up and consumed by rust, so in the*

* Pol. lib. i. c. 2.

same manner must those be enervated who enjoy a long peace if they continue negligent, lazy and inactive. I ought not to omit the *incomparable advantage* that will flow from our vigilance in this respect, which *Aristotle* very wisely directs us to attend to, and that is the PRESERVATION OF LIBERTY. Hence he supposes, contrary to the opinion of *Plato*, that a * fifth species of citizens is absolutely necessary in every commonwealth, namely, † Soldiers. *This ‡ body of men*, he says, *will be vastly useful to protect them from the hostile incursions of their neighbours, lest an assembly of FREEMEN should become a despicable multitude of SLAVES:*

* Pol. lib. 4. c. 4.

† What sort of Soldiers the author means will be seen in the sequel of this discourse, namely, a *National Militia*.

‡ Arist. Pol. lib. 2. cap. 8.

*for * those that have no arms in their hands must always be the slaves of those that have.* If we cast our eyes among the different potentates of the world, we shall find that those are the *most* liable to injuries who are the *least* able to repel them, and whom their enemies can attack with the most impunity.

6th, The same philosopher is likewise for chusing out young men, in order to manage and sustain a war. He thinks these the most eligible, because nature has bestowed upon them a greater fortitude and presence of mind. And since every republic ought to be formed in such a manner, as to be able not only to act *defensively*, but also to *offend* its enemies; hence it plainly ap-

* This sentence ought to be remembered by every *Englishman*, who has the least regard for the welfare of his country.

pears, that *they ought not to be destitute of arms*. If it is the duty of the citizens of every state to defend themselves against foreign force, it is plain that such force can no otherwise be broke but by their endeavours to oppose them. As it is an allowed maxim among rational beings, that they have a right to repel force with force, so by the same law of nature they have the same right to oppose the arms of their enemies by the power and exertion of arms. It does not seem at all unjust that one nation should wage war with another upon account of some grievous injury or offered violence, in order to repair the loss they have sustained, and to punish the guilty. And, what adds to its weight is, that * *Grotius* endeavours to support this sentiment. For

* Grot. de J. Bell. & Pacis lib. 1. cap. 2. §. 3, 4.
this

this seems to be one justifiable cause of undertaking a war, that we may live in peace and security without fear of injustice and oppression. But what must we say of those states, whose very plan of government naturally leads them to extend their dominions, and to a sort of *universal monarchy*, and which are so regardless of the blessings of peace, that they are almost always waging war with their neighbours from a thirst of gain, of which they are really insatiable? Amongst this number you may justly reckon the *Roman* and *Spartan* commonwealths. Truly it seems sufficiently evident to me, that such nations as these, above all others, ought not to be deficient in the strength and number of their soldiers, unless they have a mind to relinquish the first principles of government.

7th, We have no occasion in this discourse to enter into a tedious dispute, whether the wars undertaken by such sort of republics are agreeable to *the law of nature* or not, or in short what are the justifiable causes of engaging in a war. It is sufficient to say, that when once *any nation* has proposed this end to herself, the wars that are entered upon are generally unlawful and unjust, because a lust of power, and a strong inclination to * extend dominion, is almost always accompanied with iniquity. I shall omit any farther disquisition into this subject, as foreign to my purpose, and especially as it has been already so acutely handled by the beforementioned *Grotius* in his incomparable work, concerning *the rights of War and Peace*.

* This may well be applied to the unjust usurpations of the *French nation* for upwards of 200 years past.

As

As to myself, I shall resume the subject of a MILITIA, which I esteem so highly conducive to the preservation of every commonwealth: May *divine providence* favour the undertaking!

8th, It will not be amiss, I think, before we enter upon the subject, to give you the definition of a *Militia* from *Lipsius*. * *It is a body of men under certain regulations, ready and arrayed in arms, either to offend their enemies or defend themselves.* Now this body of men must either be *collected from our own people, be hired from abroad, or sent to us by nations in alliance.* We may justly therefore divide every species of *Militia*, as our worthy and most learned president has done in his observations upon *Machiavel's Prince*, into *national, mercenary* and

* Lib. de Milit. Rom. Dial. 2d.

auxiliary. Again, we may subdivide *mercenary troops* into those who are *hired at home*, or those who are *brought from abroad*. *Auxiliary forces* may likewise be distinguished, either into such as fight merely for the sake of a *promised subsidy*; or, regardless of that, pretend to consider only the advantage of the nation whose cause they espouse. We are not insensible that several other divisions may be made, and that many things will readily occur to a man who professes to write a treatise upon military affairs, because it ought to be the business and policy of every community to render a *Militia useful* and subservient to the interests of the state. But I shall confine myself in this present dissertation to treat of the use and importance of only those *three species* of *Militia* before-mentioned.

mentioned. Our excellent * president has in some measure set me an example, and animated me to this undertaking. He has already set down several things in his notes upon *Machiavel's* book *de Prin.* in order to elucidate this argument. He was excited to it by two reasons; both upon account of the dignity and excellence of the subject, and because neither he, or any other writer, had done justice to it, and treated it in the manner it deserved.

9th, It is not at all surprizing to those who are conversant with ancient story, that the *Roman people* should arrive to such an extravagant height of power, though they waged such terrible wars with the most powerful nations of the world, if we consider that *the event* of those wars was very rarely unfortunate.

* *Conringius.*

It cannot indeed be denied, that they were often overcome in battle; but, in the whole course of the war, we shall find, by a strange and amazing turn of fortune, that victory inclined to the *Roman* side. I have no mind to enter into a long detail of the principal causes that contributed to its greatness, from the first slender beginnings of this republic. But if we barely relate the fact as it really was, it will appear that *the exercise and practice of arms alone conduced to extend and aggrandize the power of the Roman empire. Vegetius* also, and *Dion Cassius*, concur in this opinion. It will be easy to shew that the arts of peace contributed very little or nothing to that envied greatness, which they afterwards arrived at. For, as we have before observed, they despised the tranquillity of the state, and could substitute nothing to allay the
thirst

thirst of power, and induce the citizens to taste the sweets of repose. The reason was, because they had very *few laws* that would lead them to a life of peace, and make them sensible of the blessings of social virtue. The truth of this is evident from the temple of *Janus*, which was only shut in times of peace. So addicted were the *Romans* to war, that the doors were closed but twice during the space of almost 700 years; so that this republic, which was first founded by arms, still advanced itself, and triumphed by the same violent means.

X. At *Rome* all *military services* were performed by their own citizens. The manner in which this was done, as we learn from * *Lipsius*, the interpreter of *Polybius*, deserves to be very

* Dial. 3. de Milit. Rom.

accurately examined. *This custom*, so extremely beneficial, ought to be imitated by most; I had almost said by every different kind of commonwealth in the world. But, to avoid prolixity, we do not think proper to quote *Polybius's* own words. However, it is easy to learn from this writer, that their *enlisting the natives* was principally designed for this purpose, that they might have a sufficient number *ready and exercised in arms*, in case any *sudden occasion* required it. Most of them therefore addicted themselves to arms, and *had the happiness to see that they should not be excluded from sharing the honours of their country, if they engaged themselves, and acquired any reputation in the service.* We may easily therefore credit *Livy*, speaking of the first general muster in the reign of *Servius*

Servius Tullius. He * tells us that 800000 citizens are said to have been reckoned in that enrollment. But Fabius Pictor, the most ancient of writers, adds, that this was the number of those who were able to bear arms. And in another part of his work we find, that in the second *Punic War*, after the fatal battle of *Cannæ*, in which such numbers of citizens were slain, the war was carried on by no less than eighteen legions. It almost exceeds all belief, what *Pliny* says of the *Romans* upon the approach of the first *Gallic* war. *Italy alone*, † he tells us, when *Æmilius Paulus*, and *Attilius Regulus* were *Consuls*, upon the first advice of the irruption of the *Gauls*, without any foreign assistance, and without counting

* Liv. lib. 1. lib. 23.

† Pl. lib. 3. c. 20.

those beyond the Po, raised an army of 80000 horse and 700000 foot: nay, some writers increase it to a greater number.

XI. If an enemy approached the confines of *Rome*, or immediate succour was to be brought to their neighbouring allies, they did not think proper to summon the several tribes, and yet were able to raise an army expeditiously, by no means raw and undisciplined. This kind of soldiers they called their * *new levies*. If any sudden disturbance arose, or a war either with *Italy* or *Gaul*, the General appointed to command the army immediately repaired to the *Capitol*, and brought out

* There was a wide difference between the *subitarii* and *evocati Milites* among the Romans. The *subitarii* were such as were raised on a sudden upon any emergency; the *evocati* were their brave Veterans, to whom the *Consuls* sent letters when they desired their attendance.

two standards, one of a *red*, and the other of a *blue* colour; the first under which the *foot*, and the other under which the horse were to enlist; the commander calling out at the same time, "*Let all those who have a mind to save the commonwealth follow me.*" This was called a *confederacy* to support the state.

XII. The *Romans* flourished for several ages in a surprizing manner by this excellent management of employing their own people in their wars. The same thing may likewise be said of the *Venetians*; for, as *Machiavel* observes in his *Prince*, if we examine the origin and progress of this people, we shall easily perceive that they always succeeded best when their armies were composed of their own people. But as soon as they began to wage war upon the Continent, they neglected this prudent practice, and followed

followed the Italian customs. The Italian states truly were fond of hiring mercenary soldiers. But if, as he goes on, the Venetians had acted with the same wisdom and prudence in this, as they did in other respects, beyond all dispute they would have surprized the world with a new monarchy. In like manner the Roman power must necessarily dwindle to nothing, as soon as they ceased to use their own national Militia. This foolish practice was introduced in the time of their Cæsars. This advice was first given by Mecænas to Augustus, when he consulted him how he might establish his power upon the ruins of the commonwealth. This may easily be gathered from † Dion, as Xylander interprets him. This indeed is clear, as our most learned Pre-*

* Nic. Machiav. de Art. Mil. lib. 1.

† Dion, lib. 52.

fident hath determined, *that from this advice being followed, the subjects were*
** drained of their money through all the provinces of the Roman empire, and rendered so excessively effeminate, that afterwards, upon the irruption of the more barbarous and hardy nations, their soldiery were unable to oppose them; and this vast unweildy empire tumbled headlong to nothing.* At this time the Emperor *Severus* marching with his troops into *Italy*, terrified every city in a most astonishing manner, so that almost every body trembled at the very report of his advancing army. These misfortunes were the natural consequence of pursuing such *imprudent measures*. Had it not been for this, the *Roman* affairs

* They were drained of their money to support foreign mercenaries, as is plainly the author's meaning.

would

would have been upon a much more *respectable* footing.

XIII. The ancient *Germans*, as we learn from *Tacitus* in his treatise of the manners of that people, made use of their own *National Militia*. That historian relates, that *they picked out the very flower of their youth, and placed them in the front of their army*. We all know this was a warlike nation, and by no means inferior in martial glory to any nation over which the *Roman* armies triumphed. The allied *Cantons* of *Switzerland*, as they still preserve the ancient manners of the *Germans* whole and entire, so by a *National Militia* they have supported the greatest wars, and still asserted their liberty. The * *Mamalukes* kept possession of

* Their government began in the year 641, when the *Romans* were entirely expelled out of *Egypt* by the *Saracens*. Consult *Elmacini Historia Saracenica*.

Ægypt and *Syria* for 300 years, and prospered exceedingly by depending upon their own *national troops*; though I will not affirm that all their levies were entirely of that sort. They were brought up and inured to arms from their early childhood, and were constantly accustomed to undergo military fatigues. *A sufficient number of these, invincible in war, had conquered the neighbouring nations*, as *Jovius* tells us in his life of *Selimus*, and *Guiccardin* in the 13th book of his history. The wars carried on by many other nations will afford us a multiplicity of examples.

XIV. But notwithstanding a multitude of examples may be brought undeniably to prove the utility of *a National Militia*, yet on the other side some instances may be produced, where-

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in

in it appears that *mercenary troops* have been of considerable service and advantage to several states. We may clearly discern, both from the experience and practice of our own, and of former ages, that *this kind of troops* has really been highly useful and serviceable. Few people can be ignorant that the *Persian* monarch hired many *Grecian* mercenaries, to the great profit and emolument of his kingdom. And the *Roman* empire under its *Cæsars*, not only defended itself, but even extended its dominions by the assistance of such *Soldiers*. What exploits have not the *Carthaginians* formerly performed by these * *mercenary troops*? To what a vast extent did they encrease the bounds of

* *Carthage* was brought to the brink of ruin by their own *mercenaries*, after their first war with the *Romans*, as may be seen more largely in the preface.

their

their empire by these men? Notwithstanding this, *Machiavel* is of a different opinion, both in his *Prince*, as well as his treatise upon the *Military Art*. His opinion is, that *mercenary forces are upon all accounts absolutely dangerous and unprofitable*. *Whatever nation,** he says, *is supported by these arms, cannot possibly be in a state of security, and no Soldiers can be so safe and proper as our own.*

XV. In an affair of so much delicacy, perhaps it may seem difficult to determine. Thus far, however, we may safely affirm as to this question, “*Whether it is better to make use of national or mercenary troops,*” that nothing can be positively resolved about it in this general and indeterminate manner; though some have been so

* *Machiav. lib. de Arte Milit. p. 29.*

forward in this matter. As many *civil institutions* of different countries must be differently framed, upon account of the different forms of government and dispositions of the people, so there must be the same diversity in their military appointments. Some governments are so formed, that the interest of the *sovereign* and the interest of the *subject* are equally consulted, without any direct attention to the interest of *individuals*; and these are called by *Aristotle* good and well constituted commonwealths. In others, the interest of the *sovereign* alone is principally intended, but that of the *subject* only *accidentally*; and these are said, by the same *Aristotle*, to be in a declining and corrupted state.

XVI. If we minutely examine these *two* different methods of making war, we shall not be at a loss to discover
which

which is most *eligible* to those *several states* that are differently constituted. In a * *true monarchy*, which is the first of those well-disposed commonwealths in which the King holds the reins of government, and at the same time consults the welfare of his subjects, we imagine that nothing will more contribute to the *public safety*, than to have a *regular Militia* always ready at hand, composed of *his own subjects*. For as it is the common interest of all, that the government should be kept in its *present form*, so it ought to be supported by the joint endeavours of all, which are certainly equal to the greatness of the undertaking. *And this strength can never so properly be exerted, and*

* In this and some other sections, the *English form* of government is exactly delineated, and in them we plainly discern the sentiments of a learned writer, who is absolutely unprejudiced.

called forth to action, as if the Monarch himself should permit and commit universally to his own people, according to their different age and condition, the use and practice of arms. By this wise conduct he would guard against the effeminacy of his subjects, and their incapacity of defending themselves, lest they should be obliged, in case of any imminent danger, to trust their safety to the uncertain fidelity of foreign mercenaries. By this means his subjects would be well affected to his person, when they found themselves trusted with the guardianship and protection of the state, as well as himself.

XVII. But lest any doubt should arise concerning the expediency of this measure, whether a *National Militia* ought indiscriminately to be used in every kingdom, I must beg leave to remind you, that there are *two different species*

species of monarchy, as far as concerns the present question. *One*, just before-mentioned, whose principal object of attention is the interest of the subject, and which governs by equitable laws; the *other* more cruel and severe, less tinctured with humanity, and which differs not much from *tyranny*. The only difference is, that it is not exercised contrary to the *laws*, and against the *will* of the subject, which is the proper definition of *absolute tyranny*. This is that species which *Aristotle* very justly calls a rude and *barbarous government*; because it was very commonly practiced by the barbarous nations both in *Asia* and *Africa*: and indeed we find that it obtains almost universally through the *Asiatic* and *African* nations to this day. It should seem that so *despotic a monarch* ought to be provided with a different kind of *Militia*,

Militia, because seditions and rebellions ought to be feared from a people with arms in their hands, against a government so arbitrary and imperious. An occasion may be taken from hence, either to abolish servitude entirely, or to acquire a greater degree of liberty; an occasion may be taken to slacken the reins of so harsh a despotism, and overturn the present establishment. But even in such case there is no absolute reason, why *a monarch* so circumstanced should not employ his own *national troops*. For as the same *Aristotle* very accurately remarks, even such sort of despotic governments are preserved by the ancient laws and customs upon which they were first founded. So that the proper safety of such monarchs consists in their having a *kingly*, but not a *tyrannical guard*. Care indeed ought to be taken, lest the people

ple should grow fierce and untractable by the use of arms, of which we shall take notice in a proper place.

XVIII. These things being premised, we come now to the second sort of well constituted states, I mean an *Aristocracy*. This is so called, because the wisest and best among the citizens have the principal management and direction of state affairs, and are the active defenders of the public safety. In this sort of government, there is no particular reason why the use of arms may not safely be indulged *to the people*. *For when those who govern are the grand promoters of virtue*, it is not only commendable, but necessary that they should form the minds of the citizens to the *virtues of War* (if I may be allowed the expression) as well as *Peace*, that the public safety may stand upon a firm and solid foundation. It may
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indeed be something dangerous, if the number of the common people should greatly exceed that of the wise, noble and virtuous, to permit them the use of arms without any distinction. Such a state as *Aristotle* advises, ought to chuse her Soldiers out of her own subjects, but not to keep up a great number. The * *principal Nobility* ought to be appointed their Generals and Officers, and *some foreign Soldiers* be enlisted among them, in order to check the power of the people.

XIX. But in that sort of *Aristocracy*, where the *Nobility* affect a *tyrannical* government, and disregard the interest of the people, there a *National Militia*, unwilling to become the *instruments* of

* It would be much happier for this nation, if the Nobility and Gentlemen would learn to be expert in the exercise of arms, instead of spending their time in gaming, horse-racing, and cocking.
their

their *tyranny*, may soon spread terror and desolation among their imperious rulers, and *therefore they do not chuse to employ them*. It remains therefore that we now treat of the *third* species of well constituted states, and that is a *Democracy* or popular government. In such a state as this, where all the citizens take their turns both to *command* and to *obey* for the public good, it is absolutely just and necessary that *arms* should be entrusted in their hands, that they may be ready upon all occasions, either * to *defend* their *country*, or *offend* their *enemies*.

XX. If we come to examine the reasons, why *national forces* are pre-

* To what a despicable condition are the *high and mighty States* of *Holland* reduced in a little more than 40 years, by fixing their attention entirely upon *trade*, and neglecting *military* affairs? They are at present supported only by the jealousy the several powers of *Europe* have of each other.

ferable to foreign *mercenaries* in the beforementioned states and kingdoms, we shall find many weighty and important ones, that easily evince their utility. When the danger of war appears, and the *natural born subjects* perceive the impending distresses and calamities of their country; when they behold their *wives* and *children*, those dearest pledges of love, their very *lives* and *fortunes*, and every thing at stake, unless they bravely defend them from the devouring sword of their enemies; when they remember that *dear liberty* they once possessed, and the happiness and tranquillity that attended it, what will they not attempt to support their *properties*, their *families*, their *religion*, and every thing they hold dear? What dangers will they not undergo in defence of their *native country*? And besides all this, there can be *no fear*

fear that *these men* will betray their country, who have so great an interest in its preservation.

XXI. If we add to this *the exercise* of arms, which undoubtedly ought to be a necessary circumstance, *there is no sort of Soldiers, upon which any commonwealth can so safely rely as a National Militia.* For when once arms are put in their hands, and they have been accustomed to the *use* of them, they will be more ready to face and despise dangers. The *love* of their country, and the *excellence* of its constitution, will at the same time be likewise an additional argument to excite them to the defence of it. And besides, you may more safely depend upon their obedience and *dutiful submission* to the authority of government, than upon the *fidelity* of foreigners. You will find *such men* as these in the front of the battle,

battle, bravely withstanding the most furious assaults, lest their *General* should undergo the * mortifying circumstance of a defeat. By this means they would acquire a double advantage: by a diligent practice of arms, they would not only be freed from inactivity, effeminacy and sloth, but their minds will be ready and *alert* to sustain the various chances of war, in support of their drooping country.

XXII. Let us recall to our minds our definition of a *Militia*, viz. that it is *a body of men under certain regulations, ready and arrayed in arms, either to offend their enemies or defend themselves.* This is a certain and undoubted truth; for whoever is *willing* and *able* to defend his country, will always be *ready* to do it. That a Na-

* Seneca de Clementia.

tional Militia do not want the *will*, and are naturally inclined to make a brave defence, has been already shewn, because the love of their country prompts them to combat every danger and fatigue. That they are *able* likewise, this is an evident proof, because they are *before instructed* in all kinds of *Military exercises*, and are therefore *fit* for their business. Having passed no inconsiderable part of their lives in this employment, and having their * *morals undebauched*, they will more easily submit to *discipline*, which in war will always produce the most salutary effects; for *good discipline* in war is the strength and stability of every † kingdom. *Few*

* To the shame of *England* be it spoken, that her *Soldiers* at present are, I believe, a profligate and abandoned set of men.

† Valer. Max. 11. chap. 6.

men are brave by nature, but *many* are made so by instruction and * application. These, moreover, are not inclined to *idleness*, nor to excite seditions and rebellions, which are the usual companions of that vice. For as † *Polybius* justly remarks, an *excess* of *idleness* in the Soldiers, and a withholding their wonted largesses, frequently occasion commotions in a state. There is a flagrant instance of this sort recorded by ‖ *Tacitus*, of the *Hungarian* legions. Whereas the *National Soldier* will be free from pride and insolence; he will be no *burden* to his country, because the love and regard he has for his fellow citizens will prevent any severe treatment of them. He will not be so much given to *plunder* and rapine,

* Veget. de re Milit. lib. 2. chap. 26.

† Pol. lib. 1. ‖ Tacit. lib. 1.

which

which often proves so excessively pernicious to a state.

XXIII. Besides, for I cannot avoid repeating the observation, it is *in the nature* of every well constituted government to have a *proper guard of Soldiers* ready upon every emergent occasion: but it often happens that *foreign troops* cannot be got, *even for money*. They may either be obliged to go upon some important expedition of their own; they may refuse it out of folly and caprice, or because from a fixt aversion they may rejoice at our misfortunes. And yet if a *hostile invasion* should suddenly befall us, how can we possibly be *safe* at home, unless we have a sufficient number of *our own people* ready at hand to repel the attempt? *But if* * *that nation who intends*

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* Here is our own case described with the greatest exactness. The *French Ministry* played off the *Pretender*

and attempts to invade us, knows we are prepared to receive them, they will either entirely lay aside a design so fruitless, or must attempt it with greater caution, as it will be attended with greater difficulty. Such sort of *National* forces may in general be provided at home, at a *much less expence* and *inconvenience* than they can be procured from *abroad*. But we ought to remember that a war is very rarely well managed by raw, undisciplined troops, which often bring a state to the brink of destruction. I omit that trifling objection, that a *sufficient number* cannot be collected at home, as utterly unworthy to be mentioned.

tender upon us as long as that scheme would take; when they could avail themselves of that no longer, then, as we were an *unarmed* and defenceless people, they would attempt an *invasion*. It is strange that *French policy* will not teach us a little.

XXIV. But farther, a *National Militia*, though it be encreased to a greater number, will very seldom or *never* make an ill use of their strength, but will direct all their actions to the benefit of the community, that they may enjoy the blessings of peace. They will not be importunate for *greater pay* than what the finances of the commonwealth are well able to bear. So that the riches of the citizens, which are the sinews of war, and the *only means* of preserving the state, will remain untouched and secure: as they will take *much less* to enlist them at first, so they will take *much less* to support them, and will always be content with a moderate maintenance. The *National Soldier*, since he is bound to his country by the most sacred ties, though arms are his province, and he may exult in the superiority of his skill, yet

will always use them to defend, but not oppress his countrymen. And, (since all *military men* ought to be subject to the laws of their country) when the exigencies of the state no longer require his attendance, he, of all others, is most willing to be discharged from the service. He has an earnest desire to revisit his wife and children, and enjoy the property that he left behind him. He is glad to see *Peace* restored, and to be relieved from the trouble and fatigue of a *War*. He does not expect an improvement of his fortunes by the continuance of war, but to mend his condition by attending to his domestic affairs. He hopes to earn by his labour a comfortable subsistence for himself and family.

XXV. But when * *mercenary troops* are brought from abroad, things are in

* This section deserves to be perused, not only by every member of the *two houses* of parliament, but by *every man* in the nation.

the worst imaginable situation ; they only fight *for pay*, and have no friendship or *feeling* for that people they are brought to defend. They have nothing to *lose*, and consequently nothing so much behoves them to take care of as *themselves*. Their considerations are all foreign to the purpose, and therefore they are not so much concerned to bring the war to a speedy and prosperous conclusion. The love of the country for which they fight is the last thing they think of. They have not the *same reasons* to incline them to diligence and fidelity as a *National Militia* ; and when the affairs of the state wear an unpromising aspect, are too often ready to betray it into ruin. It seldom happens that you can commend them for their *bravery* ; for they are more remarkable for an effeminate softness than apt to learn the skill and hardiness of
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the *Soldier*. At the approach of battle, as † *Tacitus* very truly observes, they are ready *to run away* without being ashamed of the action, and without paying any regard to their officers and commanders. *Homer* very elegantly describes them in his *Iliad*.

|| Down sunk their hearts, with cowardice oppress'd,

They run like hares, in shining armour drest.

XXVI. And besides, the greater part of these daily enlist themselves, either from a hope of living in luxury and idleness, or for the sake of gain; being prompted to it by a *certain levity* of mind, which inclines them to devote

† Tacit. Hist. lib. 3.

|| I cannot be certain what particular passage in *Homer* our author alludes to, though I have taken some pains to find it out.

themselves to arms, and barter away their lives for money. We may well apply here that famous verse of the poet *Lucan*.

* Base venal souls! for sordid lucre fold,

Who measure justice by the weight of gold.

No wonder indeed, when this expression is constantly in their mouths; ---“ *We do not consider the justice of the cause, but the event of the War as to ourselves.*” Such as these are generally insolent in war, addicted to robberies, wretches banished for their crimes, and without any sense, or principle of virtue; they are guilty of any and every wickedness, and universally depraved

* Venalesque manus! ibi fas, ubi maxima Merces.

in their morals. It must therefore be the hardest task to keep these dregs of mankind within the bounds of their duty; disobedient to their commanders, they run into every excess of riot and mischief: to repeat the words of Tacitus, " they strive to exceed each other in " impudence, prophaneness and debauchery;" astoo many, alas, have experienced to their costs. Hence it is that they contract so great a contempt for that *very nation*, with whose money they are *hired and paid*, and are but too ready to burn, waste and destroy their towns, goods and possessions in the same manner as if they were *enemies*. As *Curtius* elegantly expresses it, "*they are the plunderers of that very " country they ought to defend from rapine and violence."* And lastly, unless you pamper them to the full, and largely supply them with every convenience, or for any other inconsiderable reason, they

they are ready to * *rise in arms against that very nation they were meant to succour, and reduce it to a much more miserable condition than it was before.*

XXVII. We have before explained to you *the reasons* why, when the danger of war is most imminent, it may be difficult to procure a sufficient number of *foreign mercenaries*. The reasons are many; *the levies* abroad may be *too small* for the purpose; that nation may be unwilling to part with her men, or perhaps glad to see your power humbled and reduced within narrower bounds. Why should I mention *the vast expence that attends a constant re-*

* I cannot avoid in this place reminding my dear countrymen of their danger. God forbid that I should suppose there is any *immediate* danger from the *present mercenaries* now in this kingdom, I hope there is not, and perhaps it was a *prudent measure* as we are at present *unarmed*; but *whose fault* is it that we are so?

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course to this expedient of hiring mercenary troops; it is such an expence as few nations, unless excessively rich indeed, are able to support. It is not only *procuration money* that we ought to complain of, but much more must be expended to maintain them, and provide them with every thing necessary for a campaign. This must be done, not only to enable them to do their duty, but to prevent them from extorting by violence what they suppose themselves *to want*, and from fomenting any disturbances in the state. There is moreover a *prodigious danger* if you encrease *their numbers* too much. When once they find themselves *superior* to that nation they were brought *to serve*, they are but too apt to enter into conspiracies, not only to weaken but *overturn* the state. This design is most likely to succeed, if they are commanded

manded by *a General of their own*, who is a man of an ambitious and enterprizing genius; such a man will neither discover nor prevent their unjust attempts, but rather conceal it, and abuse his power to promote his own interest.

XXVIII. But besides, when these *mercenary wretches* are to be dismissed, either at the conclusion of the war, or when the danger of an *invasion* is over, they are in general extremely unwilling to depart. They wisely foresee that by this means they shall lose their hopes of gain, that all the delicacies of life will be over, and that they must have their living again to seek. Upon this account they either still insist upon their *pay* and refuse to be disbanded, or else if they submit to that, infest that very country which has hitherto *paid* and employed them, with continual robberies, rapines and murders;

ders; so that it is not able to recover its former flourishing condition in the compass of many years. Add to this, that *the citizens* of such a state, which has *enslaved* itself to such a *mercenary Militia*, must remain *entirely ignorant of the use of arms, and unavoidably become unwarlike and effeminate*. 'They must therefore place their whole confidence in such *fellows* as these, and not in themselves. *What can be more miserable and corrupt than such a nation as this?*

XXIX. The arguments before produced sufficiently prove the folly and danger of having *mercenary troops*. On the contrary, the advantages that will arise to any state by having a *national Militia*, are plain and evident. No man will, I think, hereafter affirm a *mercenary army* to be invincible, unless he is entirely ignorant of the *Roman History*,

History, where we find that even *Hannibal* himself, one of the greatest Generals the world ever produced, with all his *veteran mercenaries* about him, was at last conquered by a *Roman Militia*. There is no reason to fear that a national *Militia* will prove dangerous to the state, and seize the government, though they should happen to have a General so wickedly disposed. No such actions have ever been committed by natural born subjects, armed by the authority of the laws, but they have been rather the brave asserters and defenders of their country's liberty, as the history of all ages has most clearly evinced. *Sparta* enjoyed its freedom for 800, and *Rome* for 400 years, by the help and assistance of such a *Militia*. *Machiavel* makes this universal observation in his treatise of the military art, That there never was a founder

founder of any republic who did not consider at the same time how he was to defend his new acquired government *by those very arms* by which it was first established and procured.

XXX. How many nations may we not find that have been *kept unarmed*, become an *easy prey* to foreigners. Witness the miserable state to which *Italy* was reduced, as *Machiavel* has with great truth and accuracy described it in his book *de Prin.* This unhappy nation first began this ridiculous and *destructive trade* of war. * *Sfortia*, elected Duke of *Milan*, directed all his counsels by means of *these mercenaries*, to harass and oppress his *own subjects*. All wise men, alas, lament the fate of the *German empire*, which

* *Sfortia* was Duke of *Milan* in the time of our *Henry the VIIIth*, a cruel and rapacious tyrant.

has

has been exposed to so many calamities and inconveniences since they have kept * *standing armies* on foot, and *mercenary troops* in pay. As this evil crept in and increased, so the power and authority of the state gradually decreased. *We commit our own preservation either to foreign mercenaries, or to such wretches among our own people, who are of all others the most unfit for such an employment. If we can but live in luxury and idleness, we are willing to leave the care and defence of our country to others. In the mean time the danger increases from abroad, every thing is running to ruin, and luxury bringing us to poverty at home. But it will not be difficult to recover our for-*

* *Militias* were neglected and this evil increased, when the Princes of *Europe* became fond of the splendor and parade of *regular troops*.

mer greatness and success, if we are once brought back to the ancient custom of having a disciplined and national Militia.

XXXI. Formerly in the time of *Tacitus*, as we have hinted above, the *Germans* always employed their *own national Militia*; and although at that time they did not understand the art of encampments, the method of fortifying towns, nor were then regularly formed into a *nation*, yet they became not only formidable, but at last *superior* to the most numerous armies of *Rome*. If we would still imitate the *Swiss Cantons*, which is the only nation of *Germany* that at present has a *regular Militia*, I doubt not but in a short time we should flourish in the same manner. The custom of this government is to instruct *large bodies* of her subjects in the use of arms, and to let out her superfluous people

people to hire to foreign Princes that want them. By this means *the Germans* would not only be able *to defend* themselves, but become *a terror* to all their neighbours. We may indeed amuse ourselves with *wishing* for this *happy event*, but shall scarce be able *to obtain it*. So extremely corrupt and degenerate are the manners of mankind, and they have been so long accustomed to their depravities, that the wound will not admit of a cure.

XXXII. Though we think a *National Militia* by all means preferable to *mercenary troops*, and that the chief strength and security of every nation ought to consist in such a *ready and National Militia*; yet let me not be supposed to mean, that in all well constituted states I would entirely reject the use of *mercenaries*. Many of the beforementioned inconveniences will be

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prevented, if they are only brought to make up the *full complement* of men, or by way of *auxiliaries*. But even then it ought to be understood with this restriction, that the *National Militia* at home ought greatly to exceed them in number and strength.

XXXIII. Whatever we have before advanced of the utility of a *National Militia*, will not perhaps hold good, unless in that *form* of government, where the interest of the *subject* and the interest of the *sovereign* are equally consulted. It is not at all agreeable to *other forms* of government, which are tending to *tyranny*, but in them a *mercenary army* ought to have the preference. Since we have before observed, that in every well constituted state they ought to have a *Militia*, it remains therefore that we say something of those kingdoms where the *interest* of
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the *sovereign* is alone *sought after* and regarded. These are called *arbitrary governments*, which, as appears from the *very name*, must be accompanied with some sort of *slavery*. If we are therefore resolved to keep *slaves* in their duty, it is an allowed maxim that we ought to indulge them with as *little* power and as *few* opportunities to assert their *liberty* as possible. For these reasons you must take from them the *very instruments* by which they may obtain it; that is, * YOU MUST DISARM THEM. But since *arbitrary governments* differ, as well as others, in

* When we read this passage, how can we avoid lamenting our present condition! A *disarmed people* must in the nature of things either be *slaves*, or shortly become such; and unless we alter our *measures* we shall soon become as *great slaves* as any in *Turkey* or *Japan*, either to our own *Princes* or some *foreign power*.

their form and manner, are so very numerous, and have been so from the most ancient times, it seems necessary that we should explain what sort of *Militia* is proper for *each* of them.

XXXIV. The first sort of depraved and *arbitrary government* is *tyranny*, in which *Aristotle* in his *politics* makes a *threefold* distinction. The first is, the * *Æsymnetian* form; the second, that of the barbarous nations, which is a compound in some measure, both of the *kingly* and *tyrannical* power. In our opinion, these two *intermediate states* beforementioned do not require *foreign mercenaries* so much as the next we shall mention, but *more* than

* What is meant by the *Æsymnetian* form, is that sort of government where they have the *power*, but not the *name* of *tyrant*; such as the *Archon* at *Athens*, and the *Dictator* at *Rome*. It is derived from a Greek word, αἰσυνῶ, *impero*.

a *well ordered* government. The *third* and last form is a pure and *unmixed* *tyranny* over an unwilling people whom they have no right to command; a government subject to no *law* or *reason* but the *will* of the tyrant; and where *his power* and advantage are alone the object of regard : this is the most terrible and severe of every kind of *monarchy*. If you thus rule over a reluctant people with a rod of iron, and that people are *wise* enough to know the calamities they groan under, it is impossible to suppose that they will patiently endure such unnatural bondage and slavery; they will certainly exert themselves, and take every opportunity to shake off so insupportable a yoke. In such a tyrannical state, if the people have *arms in their hands*, and understand the *military art*, they will soon be able to overturn it. Every
tyrant

tyrant therefore, highly careful of destroying his own power, will endeavour by all means to soften the *fierce manners* of the people, and render them weak and *unwarlike*. He will rather chuse to support his *unjust* authority by *foreign mercenaries*, and strive to *divert* his own citizens from the *use* of *arms*. I have observed before, that the distinguishing mark of a lawful and *kingly government* is, to be defended by its *own people*, and not by *foreigners*; so the peculiar characteristic of *tyranny* is, that it is surrounded by a crowd of *foreign mercenaries*; unless he pursues such *measures* his *tyranny* can be of no long duration.

XXXV. These measures are most successfully pursued, and a *tyranny* best founded and preserved by indulging the people in *idleness*, and diverting them with *shews*. It was by this wicked

wicked policy, that several of the *Roman Emperors*, after the birth of *Christ*, amused and deceived the people with the shadow of liberty, and by which they easily reduced and kept them under the yoke of bondage. They erected spacious *theatres*, and invented *sports* and *games* to entertain the people with the pleasures of idleness. The *Romans* were so allured by this bait, that they often lamented their *dead Cæsars*, though they were *real tyrants* when alive: they boasted of the *felicities* they enjoyed under them, and extolled them to the very skies. Even *Nero* himself, that monster of a man, was greatly regretted by the common people after his death, as *Tacitus* witnesses. And no longer ago than in the last century, *Alexander*, the first Duke of *Florence*, though he was slain by treachery,

chery, yet had so effectually enslaved the people, that they did not so much as think of recovering their former liberty. *Aristodemus*, the tyrant of *Cumæ*, ordered the *sons* of all his subjects to be kept up in nurseries, and educated like women till the age of twenty. *Cyrus*, after he had conquered *Cræsus*, took away from the *Lydians* their horses and arms, but suffered them to frequent taverns and bawdy houses, as both *Herodotus* and *Dionysius of Halicarnassus* testify. The Emperor * *John Comne-*

* The two brothers, *David* and *Alexis Comneni* were expelled from *Constantinople* by the *French* and *Venetians*, under *Baldwin*, Earl of *Flanders*; the latter settled at, and founded the empire of *Trebesond*. This family held it for above 250 years, till the last of them, *David Comnenus*, was carried captive to *Constantinople* by *Mohammed the II*d. This was the ancient kingdom of *Pontus*, governed by the great *Mitbridates*.

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nas broke the rough minds of the *Scythians*, and so captivated them with the same allurements, that they became excessively fond of him, as *Nicetas* tells us.

XXXVI. The *second* sort of declining and ill constituted states is an *oligarchy*, where the *rich* and powerful steadily pursue their own interest, and build *that power* upon the *slavery* of the people. The danger here is, lest the people relying upon their numbers, and seeing themselves so *unjustly* dealt withal, if they have *arms* in their hands, should thrust out their *insolent masters* from their usurped dominion. It almost always behoves them therefore to employ *foreign mercenaries*, and not too rashly put *arms* into the hands of their *own people*. This may conveniently be managed, if the *nobility*, who possess the supreme power, be obliged, under

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severe penalties, to accustom themselves to *the use* of arms; but on the contrary, the common people must not be openly prohibited from having *arms*, lest they should resent the affront, and seize by *violence* what they cannot obtain by *fair means*. This method would be too *barefaced*, and therefore they must either not be encouraged to use *arms*, or else ordered to provide *such* as are very costly, without any penalty annexed if they do not *provide* them. By this means they will become entirely * undisciplined and unpracticed in the *military* science: if they are under *no obligation* to bear *arms*, they

* We have a convincing proof of the truth of this remark in our own nation, where, though the ancient laws as to the *Militia* are still in force, yet, as there is no penalty annexed, and no care taken about it, the *arms* are either *lost* or become *useless* in most towns of the kingdom.

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will only mind their own business at home, become cowardly and slothful, and absolutely neglect the *art* of *War*. Thus may the commonwealth be securely kept in the hands of that very *nobility* that *first* enslaved it.

XXXVII. The *third* sort of depraved and ill constituted states is that kind of *democracy* where *the mob* govern; where their only aim is to consult their own safety, and oppress and trample upon the *rich* and powerful. Here *the people* ought to be highly solicitous to keep themselves *armed*, and superior to the *noble families*, lest they should be able to dethrone *the mob*, and overturn their *tumultuous* republic. In such a state, the *nation* in general should be *Soldiers*, but the *Nobles* diverted as much as possible from the knowledge of *arms*. In fine, they ought to be treated in the same manner as in the

Oligarchical form of government, the *rich* treated the *Plebeians*. Notwithstanding all that we have hitherto advanced, that *mercenary troops* ought to be preferred to a *National Militia* in those countries that are *tyrannically* governed; yet it will not follow, but even in these, where the subjects have been long tramelled in the ways of *slavery*, they may sometimes safely make use of their *own Soldiers*. We find that even *Turkey* itself is not entirely destitute of such a *Soldiery*: nay, it may happen from the same cause that an *absolute monarchy* may entirely employ its own *National forces* without any great danger of losing its power, as is done to this day in *Muscovy* and *Persia*. We may consult our worthy and learned President about this matter, in his animadversions upon *Machiavel's Prince*; and that we may not
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be surprized at the observation, *Aristotle* himself has satisfied us, that a *tyrant* may so far insinuate himself into the affections of *one part* of his people, that he may persuade them not only to *defend* him, but to conquer and enslave *the other*.

XXXVIII. We have perhaps said too much about these *two* different kinds of *Militia*, as they respect the *six* beforementioned *unmixed forms* of government. What will be most conducive to their safety, as they come to be variously modified and compounded will be easy to judge, as *liberty* or *tyranny* most preponderate in each of them: for this is the principal object that ought to claim our attention. We have no occasion therefore to trouble you any farther with the different species of *Militia* that are suitable to each of them. It is necessary, however, as
the

the order and design of our discourse require, that we should briefly say somewhat of the *third* sort, (*viz.*) an *Auxiliary Militia*.

XXXIX. *Tacitus* very judiciously observes, as to the empire of *Syria*, founded by *Seleucus*, that *auxiliary* forces were extremely pernicious to that powerful people. “ *When they were*
 “ *unanimous, he says, they despised the*
 “ *Parthians, but when they disagreed*
 “ *among themselves, then every one*
 “ *called in assistance to defeat his ri-*
 “ *val, till at last being sent for to sup-*
 “ *port one part, he easily overcame*
 “ *and subdued the whole.*” We find the same thing related by *Xenophon* of the *Carians*, who having called in *Cyrus* to their aid and assistance, were entirely subjugated by him. *Justin* gives us the same account of *Philip* King of *Macedon*, who, “ *under pre-*
 “ *tence*

“ tence of affording aid to the weaker
 “ side, obliged both the conquerors and
 “ the vanquished to submit to monar-
 “ chical slavery.” The same thing is
 reported by *Polybius* of the *Messenians*,
 who were deceived and conquered by
 the *Romans* under the same pretence
 and appearance of friendship. Why
 should I mention the shocking indig-
 nities and barbarities which the *Britons*
 suffered from the *Saxons*, who were
invited over in the same manner? It
 is better to read the account itself in
 the * history of *Ubbo Emmius*. In short,
 the histories of ancient nations are filled
 with the most terrible accounts of this
 sort, where you may find that *subsi-*
diary forces have proved the *greatest*

* The work that our author alludes to, is the
 history of *Friseland*, in three volumes, by *Ubbo*
Emmius, and published at *Arnheim* in the year
 1605.

detriment to those states that sent for them.

XL. Though the instances before produced, undeniably prove the danger of *such a Militia*, yet we ought not absolutely to infer from hence, that *auxiliary forces*, either *whole* or *in part*, should not be employed by any commonwealth whatever: perhaps such a sort of *Militia* was directly *contrary to the constitution of that state*, where they were so highly prejudicial; or they might rely too much upon them. *However, after all, it must be confessed, that many grievous and heavy calamities have befallen several nations, by their trusting either to mercenary or subsidiary troops.* 'The only way to remedy this evil is, by observing the precept of *Livy*, "*that great care should be taken by the Generals not to trust so much to foreign auxilia-*
ries,

ries, but that their own National troops should greatly exceed them in number and strength." Then it will not be in their power to destroy or overturn the state.

XLI. Perhaps it may not be foreign to our purpose, to enquire in this place what sort of *auxiliaries* may be of service to well managed states. We have before divided *auxiliary forces* into such as serve *for pay*, or those that come under pretence of *voluntary assistance*; the *first* is more safe than the *second*, because it will have a greater regard for that government, from which it receives its *present pay* and support. Thus for example, the *Swiss Soldiers* are *hired* by several foreign states and Princes; they serve them faithfully, and are of prodigious service to those that *pay* and employ them.

Q

XLII.

XLII. That other species of *auxiliary Militia* which is sent to our assistance, under a pretence of the *common advantage* of both, is not so safe as the former. As soon as ever that advantage ceases to be *mutual*, and they have a particular view to their own interest, they are too apt to desert us in our greatest need, and to leave us in a much worse state than they found us. It will be extremely difficult in such a case, to stop these *licentious wretches* from rapine and plunder. The only check to repress their insolence and depredations is a * *numerous well disciplined and National Militia*; by observing this necessary caution, what a

* Our author very judiciously closes his work as he began, with advising an able and well regulated Militia in every *free country*, where the interest of the subject is, or ought to be consulted. *Qualis ab incæpto processerit, & sibi constet.*

prodigious

prodigious benefit did the *Romans* receive from *auxiliary forces*? The *Latins* even boasted, as *Livy* assures us, that the army of the *allies*, or the *auxiliary troops*, were equal in number to the whole *Roman power*. The *Romans* were so sensible of their strength, that afterwards, when discord arose between *them* and their *allies*, and the *latter* prepared to attack them, even the *Romans* themselves looked upon it as the most dangerous and desperate war they were ever engaged in. It is not at all necessary to accumulate examples, in which it will appear, that *auxiliaries* have rather consulted *their own* interest than the interest of that nation they pretended to serve. It will be sufficient to call to mind the history both of *our own* and *past* times. What has been offered by *Machiavel*, both in his *Prince* and in other parts of his works,

works, is not of such consequence as to deserve or require a recapitulation. In every part of this argument we need only consult the notes and *observations* of our worthy and learned President. As to ourselves, we have executed this work to the best of our knowledge and abilities, and therefore shall leave its importance to the consideration of the reader.



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